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§ 21.01 Introduction* **
On January 6, 2014—nearly a year-and-a-half before declaring his can-
didacy—Donald J. Trump appeared by phone on the television program 
Fox & Friends. When asked about climate change, Trump responded:
Well, it’s a hoax. I think the scientists are having a lot of fun . . . . The problem 
we’re doing is we’re making our manufacturing . . . non-competitive . . . . And 
if you look at what’s going on in China, if you look at what’s going on in India, 
they’re not spending ten cents in their factories, and then we’re supposed to com-
pete. And you can’t compete when you can’t use fuel.1
And thus, in less than 30 seconds, Trump summarized what soon would 
become the crux of his energy policy as President of the United States.
For those concerned about climate change, the Trump administration’s 
energy policy is alarming. It aims to unravel every corner of the Obama 
administration’s climate legacy, consistent with an overall sweep of deregu-
lation. Substantively, the Trump policy also departs starkly from the 
approach of the last decade, embracing traditional energy sources—fossil 
fuels and nuclear power—above all else.
* Cite as Lincoln L. Davies, Tyler Hubbard & Christopher Sanders, “Trump, Energy 
Policy, and Hard Look Review,” 64 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 21-1 (2018).
** Lincoln L. Davies is the Hugh B. Brown Presidential Endowed Chair in Law and Asso-
ciate Dean for Academic Affairs at the University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law. An 
internationally recognized expert in energy law and policy, Professor Davies is co-author 
of one of the nation’s leading energy law casebooks, Energy Law and Policy (2d ed. 2018), as 
well as co-author with Joseph Tomain of an international treatise on U.S. energy law, Energy 
Law in the United States of America (2015). He has written extensively on energy, environ-
mental, and administrative law, and in particular on renewables and alternative energy, 
rooftop solar, renewable portfolio standards and feed-in tariffs, nuclear energy, carbon 
capture and sequestration, and regulatory and technology innovation.
Tyler Hubbard is the Faust Research Fellow, S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of 
Utah.
Christopher Sanders is the Quinney Research Fellow, S.J. Quinney College of Law, Uni-
versity of Utah.
The authors are indebted to David Adelman, John Cossa, Keith Rizzardi, Peter Schaum-
berg, and Amy Wildermuth for helpful comments on an earlier draft, and to Emily Aplin, 
Melissa Bernstein, Suzanne Darais, Kerry Lohmeier, and Kiley Tilby for research assistance. 
A portion of this chapter draws on speeches Professor Davies gave for the Australian Insti-
tute of Energy (AIE) in July and August 2017. He is grateful to both AIE and the Rocky 
Mountain Mineral Law Foundation for the opportunity to address this important topic and, 
in particular, to John Blik, Steve Blume, Samantha Christie, Penny Crossley, David Deisley, 
Margo MacDonnell, Murray Meaton, James Prest, Charles Rendigs, Alex Ritchie, Albert 
Thompson, and Shawn Welch.
1 “Fox Regular Donald Trump Decries Climate Change ‘Hoax’: Attributes Climate Warn-
ings to Scientists ‘Having a Lot of Fun,’ ” Media Matters (from Fox News’ Fox & Friends (Jan. 
6, 2014, 9:49 AM)), https://mediamatters.org/video/2014/01/06/fox - regular - donald - trump 
- decries - climate-change/197432.
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For those who favor President Trump’s overarching political vision, 
however, there is much to applaud in this approach. The Trump energy 
policy aligns directly with his economic philosophy. As he noted on Fox 
& Friends, in his view, energy drives economic progress—and economic 
progress translates directly to international political power. Consequently, 
the Trump energy policy clutches at its heart the idea that returning to 
old energy patterns will resurrect a halcyon version of the United States: 
a middle-class-rich industrial export economy buoyed by U.S.-owned, 
 U.S.-extracted, and U.S.-made energy.
To bring this vision to life, President Trump now is doing what the 
quasi-celebrity television commentator who appeared on Fox & Friends 
never could. Swiftly and definitively, he has launched an all-out deregula-
tory offensive. At one level, this offensive feels unparalleled. It is, at least, 
unmatched since the Reagan era. At another level, it is hardly anything new. 
As the U.S. Supreme Court observed over 50 years ago, federal agencies “do 
not establish rules of conduct to last forever,” but rather, “adapt their rules 
and practices to the Nation’s needs in a volatile, changing economy.”2
The Trump administration’s moves on energy thus beg the question: 
What limits, if any, does this policy approach face?
This chapter begins to answer that question. Employing the lens of arbi-
trary and capricious, or “hard look,” review from administrative law, the 
chapter outlines principles that may constrain the Trump administration 
going forward—as well as areas where the administration has room to 
move.
Our contributions are threefold. First, we detail the pentagonal prin-
ciples that define the Trump energy policy (yes, there is a policy). Second, 
we establish that this policy is highly political in nature, in that it both 
predates Trump’s time in office and is connected to very specific projects 
and rules (even if that focus is short- rather than long-term). Third, we 
summarize the administration’s efforts to date and then explain the ways 
in which hard look review is likely (or unlikely) to throw up barriers to 
those actions.
Four sections comprise the remainder of the chapter. Section 21.02 
describes the Trump energy policy. Section 21.03 summarizes the actions 
the Trump administration has taken to implement this policy. Section 
21.04 details the hard look doctrine and applies it, conceptually, to the 
Trump energy policy. Section 21.05 concludes.
2 Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 387 U.S. 397, 416 (1967).
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§ 21.02 Trump Energy Policy in Context
For decades, a favorite pastime of U.S. politicians has been declaring that 
our nation has “no” energy policy.3 From Jimmy Carter to George W. 
Bush, the refrain is all too common. The echoes are so similar they are 
almost eerie. “Our country now,” President Carter intoned in 1976, “has no 
comprehensive energy program or policy.”4 In 2000, President George W. 
Bush readily agreed: “[O]ur country has a great and urgent need for a com-
prehensive energy policy . . . . Today, America has no energy policy . . . .”5
Given this long tradition, the Trump administration’s approach marks 
a stark contrast. Out of the gate, Donald J. Trump—first the social media 
commenter, then the candidate, and now the President—has taken a differ-
ent path from his predecessors. His claim has not been that the nation lacks 
an energy policy, either literally or by invoking the claim to demand change 
in a quasi-veiled way.6 Rather, President Trump asserts that the nation’s 
policy under President Obama was flawed—and that it must be replaced 
by a new and better version, a policy that, as he says, puts “America first.”7
Perhaps it should not be surprising that President Trump has been so 
upfront about his energy agenda. Certainly his administration has not 
been coy about its aims in other contexts.8 Still, early on, the suggestion 
that the Trump administration had a coherent energy policy often was 
met as a somewhat startling revelation. Now, that reaction has subsided, 
as the administration’s efforts over the last year-and-a-half have etched the 
policy’s contours more plainly into view.
What is remarkable is that this policy did not crystallize during the cam-
paign or even as the Trump presidency began. Instead, it arose from a loose 
conglomeration of ideas espoused by Donald Trump long before he was 
a serious contender for the White House. In short: There is a direct and 
unbroken line that can be traced from what the Trump administration is 
3 See Lincoln L. Davies, “Tracing U.S. Renewable Energy Policy,” 43 Envtl. L. Rep. News 
& Analysis 10320, 10321 (2013).
4 Comm’n on Presidential Debates, “The First Carter-Ford Presidential Debate” (Sept. 
23, 1976), http://www.debates.org/index.php?page=september-23-1976-debate-transcript.
5 George W. Bush, Speech in Saginaw, Michigan: A Comprehensive National Energy 
Policy (Sept. 29, 2000) (transcript available at https://archive.li/o5aB1).
6 See, e.g., Davies, supra note 3; Joseph P. Tomain, “The Dominant Model of United 
States Energy Policy,” 61 U. Colo. L. Rev. 355 (1990).
7 See Fact Sheet, White House, “President Donald J. Trump’s Foreign Policy Puts Amer-
ica First” (Jan. 30, 2018).
8 See Carol E. Lee, “Trump’s Bluntness Unsettles World Leaders,” Wall St. J. (Feb. 3, 
2017). But cf. Bruce Brown & Selina MacLaren, “Holding the Presidency Accountable: A 
Path Forward for Journalists and Lawyers,” 12 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 89, 95 (2018) (noting the 
Trump administration’s lack of transparency).
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doing on energy today, back to the promises Trump the candidate made, 
and then back even further to years of Trump’s ubiquitous social media 
commentary.
This revelation—that the Trump energy policy has been extraordinarily 
consistent over time—is almost as important as context for understanding 
the policy as is detailing the content of the policy itself. It highlights how 
fully and thoroughly political the policy is—a fact that parties might rely 
on in trying to show that the policy shifts are untethered to the factual or 
scientific record.
[1] Early Days
Historians of a prior generation may either bemoan or marvel (or both) 
at reliance on 140- and 280-character missives as the primary source of a 
president’s thoughts. But for someone who was not a public figure in any 
real sense prior to taking office, this, for now, is as good as it gets. Both the 
seeds and the roots of the Trump energy policy rest primarily in tweets.
The tweets are telling. Long before 2016, Mr. Trump lamented that the 
United States was not using its energy resources to play a larger—or differ-
ent—role on the world economic stage. In September 2011, he declared: “If 
China had a tenth of the natural resources we do then they would already 
be energy independent. Instead we continue to buy oil from OPEC.”9 The 
theme then continued. Just over a year later, Trump wrote: “Technology has 
shown we have tremendous energy resources right under our feet . . . .”10 
Then, the next month, this: “If we do not win energy as a country, we just 
do not win, period!”11
These ideas—that the United States needs to be not just energy indepen-
dent but also ascendant, and that this kind of energy ascendancy equates to 
global economic domination—would later become the centerpiece of the 
Trump energy policy. He both foreshadowed and drove home the point in 
a 2014 missive: “If America unlocked its energy potential, we would once 
again be the most powerful country in the world.”12
Within this framework, three unconnected energy ideas consis-
tently ran throughout Mr. Trump’s pre-presidency social media political 
9 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Sept. 16, 2011, 2:20 PM), https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/114811039996063744.
10 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Sept. 19, 2012, 7:59 AM), https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/248436233041215488.
11 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Oct. 17, 2012, 7:55 AM), https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/258566974085423104.
12 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Apr. 21, 2014, 1:24 PM), https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/458340513486475264.
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commentary. First, he repeatedly suggested that government regulation 
needlessly limits the energy industry. That was precisely the conclusion he 
used for his 2014 tweet asserting that energy could make the United States 
“the most powerful country in the world.” That dream is possible, Trump 
said, but “Washington is holding us back.”13 Less than two months later, he 
revisited the point: “Obama’s war on coal is killing American jobs, mak-
ing us more energy dependent on our enemies & creating a great business 
disadvantage.”14
Second, Trump was unabashed about what energy sources he wanted 
to pick as winners. In his eyes, this was quite simple: Established energy 
sources—fossil fuels and nuclear power—are good. Emergent energy 
sources—renewables—are too expensive, unreliable, and bad. As Trump 
wrote in 2011, “OPEC is ripping us off on oil. We are ripping ourselves off 
by investing in unproven green energy.”15 The refrain was so common he 
even noted it himself. “Should have gone after the oil years ago,” Trump 
tweeted in late 2015, “like I have been saying.”16 Thus, in Trump’s mind, 
energy choices were easy and clear. “Fracking poses ZERO health risks” 
and “increases our national security by making us energy independent,” 
he said.17 The Keystone XL Pipeline should be built because it “will create 
20,000 jobs and lower gas prices. But Obama says No. Dumb.”18 By con-
trast, renewables could only cause problems in Trump’s view. The Obama 
administration, Trump said, “pissed away” billions of dollars on “ ‘green 
energy’ failures.”19 “It is a shame Keystone wasn’t powered by solar panels 
and wind because then @BarackObama would have wasted billions on it,” 
he lamented in 2012.20 And Trump repeatedly voiced his distaste for wind 
energy, perhaps colored by his feud with a wind project near his golf course 
13 Id.
14 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (June 3, 2014, 11:32 AM), https://
twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/473895061747695616.
15 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Sept. 23, 2011, 10:56 AM), https://
twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/117296270682497024.
16 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Dec. 6, 2015, 5:28 PM), https://
twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/673675346030542848.
17 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (May 1, 2013, 12:17 PM), https://
twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/329676026382790656.
18 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Dec. 27, 2011, 12:53 PM), https://
twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/151767567604781058.
19 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Apr. 25, 2013, 12:49 PM), https://
twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/327509770716213248.
20 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Jan. 24, 2012, 12:27 PM), https://
twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/161908088851529728.
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in Scotland.21 “Wind turbines are ripping your country apart and killing 
tourism. Electric bills in Scotland are skyrocketing-stop the madness,” 
Trump tweeted in March 2014.22
Third, Trump consistently expressed skepticism about climate change 
and its role in energy policy. Sometimes these views confused basic defi-
nitional differences between weather and climate, such as his tweet from 
February 2014: “Massive record setting snowstorm and freezing tempera-
tures in U.S. Smart that GLOBAL WARMING hoaxsters changed name to 
CLIMATE CHANGE! $$$$.”23 Often, the tweets falsely implied (or flatly 
stated) that climate change lacks scientific support, such as his tweet from 
January 2014: “Give me clean, beautiful and healthy air - not the same old 
climate change (global warming) bullshit!”24 And always, they saw the idea 
of regulating climate change as antithetical to his economic views. “The 
concept of global warming,” Trump famously tweeted in November 2012, 
“was created by and for the Chinese in order to make U.S. manufacturing 
non-competitive.”25
[2] Candidacy
As the Trump presidential candidacy took shape, so too did its energy 
policy. And as that policy emerged, it was hard not to notice that it sprang 
directly from the scattered political claims on energy that Mr. Trump had 
been reciting in the years prior.
By far, Mr. Trump’s most important speech on energy as a presiden-
tial candidate came the same day he reached the threshold of delegates 
to clinch the Republican nomination. It was May 26, 2016, in Bismarck, 
North Dakota. Using the Williston Basin Petroleum Conference as a plat-
form to announce his plan, Trump outlined an energy policy that aligned 
almost point for point with his earlier social media commentary.
Trump began by reemphasizing the idea that energy wealth is linked to 
economic wealth—and that economic wealth determines global political 
21 See, e.g., Philip Bump, “Trump’s Decade-Long Fight with Scotland Is Why He Thinks 
Putin Wanted Clinton to Win,” Wash. Post (July 12, 2017).
22 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Mar. 19, 2014, 5:00 PM), https://
twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/446436045178302464.
23 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Feb. 5, 2014, 2:57 AM), https://
twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/431018674695442432.
24 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Jan. 28, 2014, 10:44 PM), https://
twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/428418323660165120.
25 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (Nov. 6, 2012, 11:15 AM), https://
twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/265895292191248385.
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power. “A Trump administration will develop an America First energy 
plan,” Trump proclaimed. “America first, folks, America first!”26
He then hinted at a theme he would later emphasize as president. Prior 
administrations repeatedly had called for the United States to become 
“energy independent.”27 Trump, however, saw that goal as too low. Instead, 
he suggested the United States should seek energy “dominance.” He 
explained: “[H]ere is how we’re going to do it. And here is how this plan 
will make America wealthy again. American energy dominance will be 
declared a strategic economic and foreign policy goal of the United States. 
It’s about time.”28 This, Trump said, was possible because the United States 
enjoys tremendous energy wealth. “We’re loaded,’ ” Trump repeatedly 
exclaimed in Bismarck. “[W]e didn’t even know it. We’re loaded! We had 
no idea how rich we were. We’re richer than all of ’em . . . .”29
With these broad objectives in place, Mr. Trump then laid out what 
he called his 100-day energy action plan. Consistent with his previously 
expressed views, this plan focused on promoting fossil fuels, rolling back 
Obama-era regulations, and stepping away from efforts to engage in cli-
mate mitigation. “[W]e’re going to rescind all the job-destroying Obama 
executive actions, including the Climate Action Plan,” Trump declared. 
“[O]kay? Remember that. We’re going to save the coal industry! We’re 
gonna save that coal industry! Believe me, we’re gonna save it! I love those 
people - these are great people!”30 In particular, Trump indicated that he 
wanted to pave the way for the Keystone XL Pipeline, going so far as to say 
he would specifically “ask Trans-Canada to renew its permit application.”31 
He also said that he would “lift moratoriums on energy production in fed-
eral areas,” “revoke policies that impose unwarranted restrictions on new 
drilling technologies,” and “cancel” the Paris Climate Agreement.32
26 Donald Trump, Speech at Williston Basin Petroleum Conf. in Bismarck, N.D., May 
26, 2016: An America First Energy Plan, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch ?v= 
kxq9lBnv0cs (transcript available at http://www.astrologicaltools.com/energy).
27 See Michael Burger, “Recovering from the Recovery Narrative: On Glocalism, Green 
Jobs and Cyborg Civilization,” 46 Akron L. Rev. 909, 919 (2013).




32 Id.; see also Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., “An America First Energy Plan,” 
https://web.archive.org/web/20161110003503/https://www.donaldjtrump.com/policies/
energy/.
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[3] Presidency
By the time Mr. Trump was sworn into office, then, the energy policy he 
was espousing was clear. It was built on five pillars. First, above all else, was 
the idea of promoting U.S. energy production and exports, consistent with 
his overall “America first” approach to economic and foreign affairs. Sec-
ond was an underlying assumption that U.S. energy sources are not mean-
ingfully limited, such that both energy “independence” and “dominance” 
are possible. Next was the idea that an onslaught of regulatory rollbacks 
was needed to achieve these goals. The fourth pillar of his policy was the 
promotion of fossil fuels and a concomitant distaste for renewables. And 
last was a strong version of explicit climate skepticism, namely, that any 
regulation seeking to rein in climate change is inappropriate by definition.
While this policy was plain as Mr. Trump took office, the President fur-
ther etched it into place in June 2017, when he gave his second key speech 
on energy to date, at an event entitled Unleashing American Energy dur-
ing the administration’s “Energy Week.” In the speech, President Trump 
drew even clearer connections between his energy and economic policies. 
Repeatedly referencing fossil fuels, he asserted: “The truth is that we have 
near-limitless supplies of energy in our country. . . . We have nearly 100 
years’ worth of natural gas and more than 250 years’ worth of clean, beau-
tiful coal.”33 This, Trump said, puts the United States “really in the driv-
ing seat” because energy wealth is the key to international power.34 Thus, 
U.S. energy wealth, he said, will unlock “a true energy revolution” that in 
turn will promote national “sovereignty” and economic progress.35 “With 
these incredible resources, my administration will seek not only American 
energy independence that we’ve been looking for so long, but American 
energy dominance. And we’re going to be an exporter—exporter. We 
will be dominant. We will export American energy all over the world, all 
around the globe.”36
Thus the fully political nature of the Trump administration’s energy 
policy was laid bare. Not only was the policy moored in the overarching 
themes on which President Trump had run for office, it was expressly 
pitched as a direct response to the prior administration. Not only did the 
policy try to recast the world of energy as something different from what 
had actually developed over prior decades, it sought to speak specifically 
to constituencies that had been harmed by the increasing globalization and 
33 Remarks, White House, “Remarks by President Trump at the Unleashing American 
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technologization of the economy. And not only did the policy lay out broad 
objectives that were political in nature, it named specific programs, proj-
ects, and regulations it would target in pursuit of those goals—irrespective 
of the government’s prior factual determinations that such policies were 
needed.
§ 21.03 Trump Energy Policy in Action
Presaged by the announcement of its 100-day energy action plan in 
Bismarck, the Trump administration wasted little time putting its policy 
into place. The President, virtually on being sworn into office, issued three 
executive orders to begin the play.
The second was the most important. Entitled “Promoting Energy Inde-
pendence and Economic Growth” and issued March 28, 2017, Executive 
Order No. 13,783 mandated a bevy of actions centered on undoing the 
Obama administration’s work.37 It rescinded President Obama’s Climate 
Action Plan38 and connected orders, including guidance on how to 
account for climate change in federal environmental reviews.39 It ordered 
federal agencies to review and potentially roll back a wide array of regula-
tions, including the Clean Power Plan, the Obama administration’s mora-
torium on federal coal leasing, and rules on methane and other climate 
change emissions in the oil and gas sector. And it compelled agency heads 
to evaluate “all existing regulations, orders, guidance documents,” and 
other agency actions that “potentially burden the development or use of 
domestically produced energy resources, with particular attention to oil, 
natural gas, coal, and nuclear energy resources.”40 Thus the order declared 
it in the national interest to develop “our Nation’s vast energy resources” 
and to reduce “regulatory burdens that unnecessarily encumber energy 
production . . . .”41 In short, the order formalized the President’s Bismarck 
energy policy—a policy that equates traditional energy development with 
economic success.
The other two executive orders pursued complementary tactics. Execu-
tive Order No. 13,776, issued January 24, 2017, and entitled “Expediting 
Environmental Reviews and Approvals for High Priority Infrastructure 
Projects,” created a process by which state governors and federal agency 
37 Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 28, 2017).
38 Exec. Office of the President, “The President’s Climate Action Plan” (June 2013).
39 The plan sought to “slow the effects of climate change” by cutting carbon emissions. 
Id. at 5. The plan consisted of “a wide variety of executive actions.” Id. In conjunction with 
the plan, the Council on Environmental Quality also issued guidance for considering 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in NEPA reviews. See 81 Fed. Reg. 51,866 (Aug. 5, 2016).
40 Exec. Order No. 13,783, § 2(a).
41 Id. § 1(a).
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heads could request “high priority” expedited review of energy and other 
infrastructure projects.42 Executive Order No. 13,795, issued April 28, 
2017, and entitled “Implementing an America-First Offshore Energy 
Strategy,” declared it national policy to “encourage energy exploration and 
production, including on the Outer Continental Shelf [(OCS)], in order 
to maintain the Nation’s position as a global energy leader.”43 This order 
reversed certain limits on offshore oil and gas leasing and commanded the 
review of multiple rules and designations applicable to the industry.
The stage was set, then, for the Trump administration to put its energy 
policy into action. The action was immediate. During his first week in 
office, the President, first, formally invited TransCanada Keystone Pipe-
line, LP to “promptly re-submit its application to the Department of 
State” to construct the Keystone XL Pipeline44 and, second, directed the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) to “take all actions necessary and 
appropriate” to “review and approve in an expedited manner” the Dakota 
Access Pipeline (DAPL) project.45 Two months later to the day, the Secre-
tary of State granted a presidential permit for the Keystone XL Pipeline.46 
Then, in even less time, the Corps green-lighted the DAPL project.47 A few 
months later, the President announced that the United States would with-
draw from the Paris Climate Agreement because it “punishes the United 
States . . . while imposing no meaningful obligations on the world’s lead-
ing polluters.”48 “I was elected to represent the citizens of Pittsburgh,” the 
President declared, “not Paris.”49
The administration’s orientation was thus clear. It put the public on 
notice that its actions would be swift and numerous—and that it would 
42 Exec. Order No. 13,766, 82 Fed. Reg. 8657 (Jan. 24, 2017).
43 Exec. Order No. 13,795, § 2, 82 Fed. Reg. 20,815 (Apr. 28, 2017).
44 Presidential Memorandum on Construction of the Keystone XL Pipeline § 2, 82 Fed. 
Reg. 8663 (Jan. 24, 2017).
45 Presidential Memorandum on Construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline § 2(a), 82 
Fed. Reg. 11,129 (Jan. 24, 2017).
46 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, “Issuance of Presidential Permit to TransCanada for 
Keystone XL Pipeline” (Mar. 24, 2017).
47 See Memorandum from Paul D. Cramer, Deputy Assistant Sec’y of the Army, to Hon. 
Raul Grijalva, U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 7, 2017) (notice to Congress and others 
of the Corps’ intent to grant an easement for DAPL for 30 years); News Release, Corps, 
“Corps Grants Easement to Dakota Access, LLC” (Feb. 8, 2017); Notice of Termination of 
Intent to Prepare an EIS in Connection with Dakota Access, LLC’s Request for an Easement 
to Cross Lake Oahe, North Dakota, 82 Fed. Reg. 11,021 (Feb. 17, 2017).
48 Remarks, White House, “Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord” 
(June 1, 2017).
49 Id.
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vigorously seek to promote domestic fossil fuels and traditional industry 
while erasing all regulations focused on climate change, just as the Presi-
dent had promised on the campaign trail. It also highlighted the trajectory 
these actions would follow: They would provoke extensive litigation,50 and 
their symbolic value would often exceed their actual impact.
Indeed, the Trump administration’s energy actions to date are so fre-
quent, copious, and divergent, they defy easy summary. Here, then, we 
focus on the five most prominent categories of action so far: onshore and 
offshore oil and gas development, federal coal leasing, the Clean Power 
Plan, and vehicle fuel efficiency standards.
[1] Onshore Oil and Gas Development
The Trump administration’s actions to promote onshore oil and gas 
development trace directly to the President’s “energy independence” 
executive order. That order directed the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) and the Secretary of the Interior to review—and presum-
ably unravel—a series of Obama-era rules designed to reduce greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions from this industry.51 The agencies wasted little time. 
Already, they have sought to delay, revoke, and replace both of the Obama 
administration’s key rules in this realm: the Waste Prevention Rule, plus a 
separate set of EPA regulations on fugitive methane and other emissions.
[a] Waste Prevention Rule
Arguably the most critical onshore oil and gas rule targeted by the Trump 
administration is the Waste Prevention Rule.52 Promulgated in November 
2016, this rule aimed to limit methane and other fugitive gas emissions 
from all onshore oil and gas projects on federal and tribal lands. When the 
Obama administration adopted the rule, data showed that these projects 
vented, flared, or otherwise lost enough natural gas in the prior six years to 
“supply about 6.2 million households for a year.”53
The rule thus implemented a goal of reducing methane leakage in federal 
and tribal oil and gas projects by 2026.54 Specifically, the rule required 
50 See, e.g., Third Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, N. Plains 
Res. Council v. Shannon, No. 4:17-cv-00031 (D. Mont. Aug. 4, 2017); Complaint for Declar-
atory and Injunctive Relief, Indigenous Envtl. Network v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 4:17-cv-
00029 (D. Mont. Mar. 27, 2017); Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. Corps, 255 F. Supp. 3d 101 
(D.D.C. 2017) (order on cross-motions for partial summary judgment).
51 Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 28, 2017).
52 Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation, 81 
Fed. Reg. 83,008 (Nov. 18, 2016) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 3100, 3160, 3170).
53 Fact Sheet, BLM, “Methane Waste Prevention Rule,” at 1 (Nov. 15, 2016).
54 81 Fed. Reg. at 83,011.
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oil and gas operators to capture specific percentages of produced natural 
gas, measure how much they flare, develop waste minimization plans, 
and upgrade or replace certain equipment.55 The rule also redefined what 
counted as “unavoidably lost” and “avoidably lost” oil and gas (i.e., “waste”), 
and imposed limits on venting and flaring.56
Out of the gate, the Trump administration sought to reverse the Waste 
Prevention Rule. The first avenue it pursued was the Congressional Review 
Act.57 That effort initially gained some traction, passing the House 221 to 
191.58 Ultimately, however, the effort foundered in the Senate, failing on a 
49 to 51 vote.59
Unmoved, the Trump administration turned to executive action instead. 
On June 15, 2017, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) issued a notice 
stating that it would postpone compliance dates for several portions of the 
rule pending resolution of litigation challenging the rule in the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the District of Wyoming.60 The BLM claimed it had author-
ity to postpone implementation under section 705 of the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA). That provision allows an agency, when “justice so 
requires,” to “postpone the effective date of action taken by it, pending 
judicial review.”61 “Considering the substantial cost that complying with 
these requirements poses to operators,” the BLM wrote, “and the uncertain 
future these requirements face in light of the pending litigation,” postpone-
ment was appropriate.62
Almost immediately, the BLM’s effort devolved into a legal ping-pong 
match. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California found 
the BLM’s delay unlawful.63 Then, the very next day, the BLM proposed 
55 Id.
56 Id. at 83,011, 83,047–48.
57 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808.
58 H.R.J. Res. 36, 115th Cong. (2017).
59 See Juliet Eilperin & Chelsea Harvey, “Senate Unexpectedly Rejects Bid to Repeal a 
Key Obama-Era Environmental Regulation,” Wash. Post (May 10, 2017).
60 The postponement applied only to the portions of the rule that were not already in 
effect.
61 5 U.S.C §  705; see also Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and 
Resource Conservation; Postponement of Certain Compliance Dates, 82 Fed. Reg. 27,430 
(June 15, 2017).
62 82 Fed. Reg. at 27,431.
63 California v. BLM, 277 F. Supp. 3d 1106 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (order granting plaintiffs’ 
motions for summary judgment).
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a new postponement until January 17, 2019.64 This time, the BLM aban-
doned its APA § 705 argument and instead cited a slate of statutes it said 
gave the agency “inherent” authority “to modify or otherwise revise the 
existing regulation in response to substantive concerns regarding cost and 
feasibility . . . .”65
This, though, was not the end of the volley. On February 22, 2018, the 
Northern District of California found this new delay also arbitrary and 
capricious and enjoined the postponement.66 “[The BLM] must provide 
at least some basis,” the court wrote, “indeed, a ‘detailed justification’—to 
explain why it is changing course after its three years of study and delibera-
tion resulting in the Waste Prevention Rule.”67
Still undeterred, the Trump administration deployed a third strategy for 
lifting the rule. On the same day the court struck down the BLM’s second 
attempt at postponement, the agency proposed a new rule to replace the 
Obama administration’s version.68 Specifically, this proposal would rescind 
key provisions of the Waste Prevention Rule and make other changes. 
First, it would terminate the waste capture percentage requirements on the 
grounds that they are “overly complex and ultimately ineffective at reduc-
ing flaring.”69 Second, it would withdraw the waste minimization, leak 
detection, equipment repair, and reporting requirements on the grounds 
that compliance costs “outweigh the value of their conservation effects.”70 
Third, the proposal would return to the pre-Obama standards for deter-
mining when gas is “avoidably” or “unavoidably” lost—and change the 
venting prohibition to a venting “limitation” that gives operators signifi-
cant leeway to vent or flare gas much as they had in the past.71
The BLM set a deadline of April 23, 2018, for public comments on its 
proposal. Meanwhile, the Trump administration notched a victory. On 
64 Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation; Delay 
and Suspension of Certain Requirements, 82 Fed. Reg. 46,458 (proposed Oct. 5, 2017) (to 
be codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 3160, 3170).
65 Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation; 
Delay and Suspension of Certain Requirements, 82 Fed. Reg. 58,050, 58,059 (Dec. 8, 2017) 
(to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 3160, 3170).
66 California v. BLM, 286 F. Supp. 3d 1054 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (order denying motion to 
transfer venue and granting preliminary injunction).
67 Id. at 1068.
68 Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conservation; 
Rescission or Revision of Certain Requirements, 83 Fed. Reg. 7924 (proposed Feb. 22, 2018) 
(to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 3160, 3170).
69 Id. at 7930.
70 Id. at 7932.
71 Id. at 7933–34.
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April 4, 2018, in response to a request from the BLM, the District of Wyo-
ming enjoined multiple provisions of the Waste Prevention Rule.72 Two 
days later, California and New Mexico appealed that decision to the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.73
[b] Fugitive Methane and Volatile Organic 
Compound Emission Limits
To complement the Waste Prevention Rule, the Obama EPA also issued 
limits on fugitive GHG and volatile organic compound (VOC) emissions 
for new oil and gas drilling, including hydraulically fractured sites.74 This 
rule imposed a wide array of requirements to limit methane and VOC 
emissions, including 95% methane emission reductions at well sites, zero 
natural gas bleed rates at processing plants, and zero natural gas emissions 
at processing pumps.75
Quickly—though less successfully than with the Waste Prevention 
Rule—the Trump administration sought to lift these requirements as well. 
First, the EPA initiated a review and gave advanced notice of a forthcom-
ing rulemaking, suggesting that the Obama-era rule was too costly.76 
Then, two months later, the EPA stayed the Obama rules twice, first for 90 
days,77 and 10 days later, for two years.78 To justify these actions, the EPA 
cited “uncertainties” regarding the rule’s application.79
This effort, however, kept for only about a month. On July 3, 2017, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit vacated the EPA’s stay, rejecting 
72 Wyoming v. DOI, No. 2:16-cv-00285 (D. Wyo. Apr. 4, 2018) (order staying 
implementation of rule provisions and staying action pending finalization of revision rule).
73 State Respondents’ Notice of Appeal, Wyoming v. DOI, No. 2:16-cv-00285 (D. Wyo. 
Apr. 6, 2018).
74 Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modi-
fied Sources, 81 Fed. Reg. 35,824 (June 3, 2016) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
75 Id. at 35,826.
76 See Review of the 2016 Oil and Gas New Source Performance Standards for New, 
Reconstructed, and Modified Sources, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,331 (Apr. 4, 2017); see also Letter 
from E. Scott Pruitt, EPA Adm’r, to Howard J. Feldman et al., “Convening a Proceeding for 
Reconsideration of Final Rule, ‘Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, 
Reconstructed and Modified Sources,’ published June 3, 2016, 81 Fed. Reg. 35824” (Apr. 
18, 2017).
77 Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modi-
fied Sources; Grant of Reconsideration and Partial Stay, 82 Fed. Reg. 25,730 (June 5, 2017).
78 Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modi-
fied Sources: Stay of Certain Requirements, 82 Fed. Reg. 27,645 (proposed June 16, 2017) 
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
79 82 Fed. Reg. at 25,733.
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the agency’s claim that it had “ ‘inherent authority’ to ‘issue a brief stay.’ ”80 
The EPA, wrote the court, “cites nothing for the proposition that it has 
such authority, and for good reason . . . . [The Clean Air Act] confers no 
such authority.”81 Accordingly, the court ordered the Obama-era rule to be 
implemented beginning July 31, 2017.82
[2] Offshore Oil and Gas Development
The Trump administration’s actions to date for offshore resources are 
more focused on encouraging production than reducing costs. The efforts 
fall into two key categories: expanding the portion of the OCS open for 
drilling and reviewing prior national marine sanctuary and marine 
national monument designations.83
[a] Outer Continental Shelf Drilling Areas
For decades, the portion of the OCS open to offshore drilling has been 
quite limited.84 Of the four broad regions of the OCS—the Alaskan, Atlan-
tic, Gulf of Mexico, and Pacific—only the Gulf of Mexico is widely open to 
new drilling. Most portions of the others have not seen new leases issued 
since the 1980s.85 This trend began when President George H.W. Bush 
issued a drilling moratorium in 1990, later extended by President Clinton, 
80 Clean Air Council v. Pruitt, 862 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
81 Id.
82 See Mandate Issued to EPA, Clean Air Council v. Pruitt, No. 17-1145 (D.C. Cir. July 31, 
2017). Subsequently, the EPA removed two Obama-era fugitive emissions requirements—
the “requirement that leaking components be repaired during unplanned or emergency 
shutdowns; and the monitoring survey requirements for well sites located on the Alaskan 
North Slope.” Fact Sheet, EPA, “EPA Amends Portion of Fugitive Emissions Requirements 
in the 2016 New Source Performance Standards for the Oil and Natural Gas Industry” (Feb. 
23, 2018); see also Oil and Natural Gas Sector: Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, 
and Modified Sources; Amendments, 83 Fed. Reg. 10,628 (Mar. 12, 2018) (to be codified 
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
83 Consistent with the offshore executive order’s direction, agencies are also reviewing 
offshore well control rules adopted after the Deepwater Horizon disaster. See Oil & Gas and 
Sulfur Operations in the OCS—Blowout Preventer Systems and Well Control, 81 Fed. Reg. 
25,888 (Apr. 29, 2016) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 250); Air Quality Control, Reporting, 
and Compliance, 81 Fed. Reg. 19,718 (proposed Apr. 5, 2016) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 
550); Oil & Gas and Sulfur Operations on the OCS—Requirements for Exploratory Drilling 
on the Arctic OCS, 81 Fed. Reg. 46,478 (July 15, 2016) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pts. 250, 
254, 550).
84 See Hiroko Tabuchi & Tim Wallace, “Trump Would Open Nearly All U.S. Waters 
to Drilling. But Will They Drill?” N.Y. Times (Jan. 23, 2018); see also Adam Vann, Cong. 
Research Serv., “Offshore Oil and Gas Development: Legal Framework” (CRS Report 
RL33404 Apr. 13, 2018).
85 See Am. Petroleum Inst., “Unlocking America’s Offshore Energy,” https://www.api.org/ 
oil - and - natural-gas/energy-primers/offshore.
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and then augmented by President Obama.86 Thus, while the OCS consists 
of approximately 1.8 billion acres, only about 178 million acres are avail-
able for oil and gas leasing, and just over 41 million acres are currently 
under lease—with only 8 million acres, or less than 0.5% of the OCS, actu-
ally producing.87
President Trump’s offshore energy executive order sought to change this. 
It specifically aimed to reverse the arguably permanent withdrawals from 
leasing that President Obama ordered in 2015 and 2016 for the U.S. Arctic 
(the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas) and certain deep canyons in the Atlan-
tic.88 It also directed the Secretary of the Interior to reconsider issuing oil 
and gas leases “to the maximum extent permitted by law” in multiple OCS 
planning areas.89
This direction had swift effect. On January 8, 2018—eight months after 
the President issued the offshore executive order—the Bureau of Ocean 
Energy Management (BOEM) officially proposed opening all but one 
region of the OCS for leasing through 2024.90 This proposal “would make 
more than 98 percent of the OCS resources available to consider for oil and 
gas leasing during the 2019-2024 period.”91 The agency requested public 
comments by March 9, 2018, and noted that it would conduct a program-
matic environmental impact review on its planned leasing schedule.92
Already, these actions have engendered litigation. On May 3, 2017, a 
coalition of environmental public interest groups filed suit seeking declara-
tory and injunctive relief, challenging the executive order’s attempt to undo 
86 See Democratic Policy & Commc’ns Comm., U.S. Senate, “Clean Energy Jobs and 
Oil Company Accountability Act: Background on Offshore Drilling and Moratoriums,” 
https://www.dpc.senate.gov/files_energybill/background_offshore.pdf. President Obama 
withdrew 3.8 million acres of the Atlantic region and 115 million acres of the Arctic region 
from development. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior (DOI), “Secretary Jewell 
Applauds President’s Withdrawal of Atlantic and Arctic Ocean Areas from Future Oil and 
Gas Leasing” (Dec. 20, 2016).
87 Inst. for Energy Research, “Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) Statistics” (June 23, 2008), 
http://instituteforenergyresearch.org/analysis/outer-continental-shelf-ocs-statistics/.
88 Exec. Order No. 13,795, 82 Fed. Reg. 20,815 (Apr. 28, 2017); see Presidential Memo-
randum on Withdrawal of Certain Areas of the United States Outer Continental Shelf 
Offshore Alaska from Leasing Disposition (Jan. 27, 2015); Presidential Memorandum on 
Withdrawal of Certain Areas off the Atlantic Coast on the Outer Continental Shelf from 
Mineral Leasing (Dec. 20, 2016).
89 Exec. Order No. 13,795, § 3(a).
90 See Notice of Availability of the 2019-2024 Draft Proposed OCS Oil & Gas Leasing 
Program and Notice of Intent to Prepare a Programmatic EIS, 83 Fed. Reg. 829 (Jan. 8, 
2018).
91 Id. at 830.
92 Id. at 829.
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President Obama’s permanent withdrawal from leasing of the Beaufort 
and Chukchi Seas and the deep canyon Atlantic areas.93 The parties argue 
that while section 12(a) of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act94 gives 
authority for presidential withdrawal of unleased OCS lands, it does not 
authorize “Presidents to undo such withdrawals.”95 As of this writing, the 
lawsuit remains pending. On March 19, 2018, the court denied the govern-
ment’s various motions to dismiss.96
[b] National Marine Sanctuaries and Marine 
National Monuments
In response to the offshore drilling executive order, the National Oce-
anic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) announced that it would 
review 11 National Marine Sanctuaries and Marine National Monuments 
within the OCS that had been designated or expanded within the last 10 
years.97 In total, these areas encompass around 425 million acres.98 NOAA 
also invited comments on a variety of factors it would consider, including 
costs of managing the areas and overall opportunity costs if the areas are 
opened to development.99 In response, NOAA received nearly 100,000 
comments, with approximately 99% of those urging the agency to keep the 
designations in place.100
In October 2017, NOAA submitted a final report to the White House. 
The report, however, remains in interagency review and has not been 
made available to the public.101 Several environmental groups have pledged 
to sue should the sanctuaries and monuments be eliminated or reduced.102
93 See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, League of Conservation Voters v. 
Trump, No. 3:17-cv-00101 (D. Alaska May 3, 2017), 2017 WL 1736693.
94 43 U.S.C. § 1341(a).
95 Complaint, supra note 93, at 1.
96 League of Conservation Voters v. Trump, 303 F. Supp. 3d 985 (Mar. 19, 2018).
97 Review of National Marine Sanctuaries and Marine National Monuments Designated 
or Expanded Since April 28, 2007, 82 Fed. Reg. 28,827, 28,828 (June 26, 2017).
98 See id.
99 Id.
100 See Paul Rogers, “Trump Gets Report that Could Open National Marine Sanctuaries 
to Oil Drilling,” Mercury News (Oct. 27, 2017).
101 See Valerie Volcovici, “U.S. Marine Sanctuary Oil Drilling Report Sent to Trump, Not 
Public,” Reuters (Oct. 25, 2017).
102 See Rogers, supra note 100.
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[3] Federal Coal Leasing
The Trump administration’s actions on federal coal leasing parallel those 
for offshore oil and gas development.103 They are a direct response to the 
Obama administration’s withdrawal of federal lands for energy develop-
ment. They aim to increase fossil fuel production.
These objectives flow directly from the “energy independence” executive 
order. That order expressly directed the Secretary of the Interior to “take 
all steps necessary and appropriate to amend or withdraw” the Obama-
era moratorium on new coal leasing on federal lands.104 The day after 
President Trump issued the executive order, Secretary of the Interior Ryan 
Zinke signed his own order seeking to implement these goals.105
Specifically, Secretary Zinke’s order both repealed the moratorium 
and eliminated the procedural framework undergirding it. In issuing the 
moratorium in 2016, then-Secretary Sally Jewell detailed concerns about 
coal market conditions and climate change as the grounds for halting new 
leases.106 The idea was that while the moratorium was in place, the BLM 
would conduct a programmatic environmental impact statement (PEIS) of 
the federal coal program, including coal market conditions.107 Prior to this 
order, the federal government had not conducted a comprehensive review 
of its coal leasing program in nearly four decades.108
Secretary Zinke’s order, however, ended the moratorium and termi-
nated the PEIS effort. Noting that both the moratorium and the PEIS were 
103 While we focus here on federal and tribal coal development, the Trump administra-
tion has been busy seeking to promote coal in other ways. These efforts include (1) propos-
ing changes to coal ash regulation; (2) repealing a rule that sought to close royalty payment 
loopholes; and (3) pursuing a variety of strategies to ensure that coal is used for electricity 
production, including by invoking little-used emergency and other statutory provisions. 
See News Release, EPA, “EPA Proposes First of Two Rules to Amend Coal Ash Disposal 
Regulations, Saving Up To $100M Per Year in Compliance Costs” (Mar. 1, 2018); Repeal 
of Consolidated Federal Oil & Gas and Federal & Indian Coal Valuation Reform, 82 Fed. 
Reg. 36,934 (Aug. 7, 2017) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pts. 1202, 1206); Stephen Lacey & 
Julia Pyper, “DOE’s Grid Reliability Study Is a Rorschach Test for the Future of Electricity,” 
Greentech Media (Aug. 23, 2017); Gavin Bade, “ ‘FERC Did Its Job:’ Former Regulators, 
Lawyers Laud DOE NOPR Rejection,” Utility Dive (Jan. 9, 2018); White House, “State-
ment from the Press Secretary on Fuel-Secure Power Facilities” (June 1, 2018); Gavin Bade, 
“FERC Regulators: No Security Emergency to Justify DOE Coal, Nuke Bailout,” Utility Dive 
(June 12, 2018).
104 Exec. Order No. 13,783, § 6, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 28, 2017). The moratorium had 
limited exceptions, including for metallurgical coal, lease modifications, and emergency 
leasing. See Secretarial Order No. 3338, § 6 (Jan. 15, 2016) (SO 3338).
105 Secretarial Order No. 3348 (Mar. 29, 2017) (SO 3348).
106 SO 3338, supra note 104, at § 2.
107 Id. § 5.
108 See id. § 2.
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discretionary, Secretary Zinke’s two-page order found the moratorium “not 
. . . [in] the public interest” and the PEIS unnecessary “to consider poten-
tial improvements to the program.”109 The PEIS, in particular, the order 
explained, would “cost many millions of dollars and would be completed 
no sooner than 2019.”110 Accordingly, Secretary Zinke directed the BLM 
to begin “process[ing] coal lease applications and modifications expedi-
tiously” and ordered “[a]ll activities associated with” the PEIS to cease.111
Now, two lawsuits seek to block Secretary Zinke’s actions. First, a coali-
tion of environmental groups along with the Northern Cheyenne Tribe 
have filed suit challenging Secretary Zinke’s order as inconsistent with 
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).112 Second, four 
states—California, New Mexico, New York, and Washington—have chal-
lenged the moratorium dissolution as both violative of NEPA113 and incon-
sistent with the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920114 and the Federal Land Policy 
and Management Act of 1976.115 Both cases are in the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Montana, which has consolidated the suits.116
[4] The Clean Power Plan
Also aiming to promote coal, the Trump administration has sought to 
unravel what many hailed as the United States’ “strongest ever climate 
action”117—the Obama administration’s Clean Power Plan (CPP).118 In 
October 2015, after hundreds of meetings, years of deliberation, and mil-
lions of public comments,119 the Obama administration finalized this rule 
109 SO 3348, supra note 105, at § 4.
110 Id. § 3.
111 Id. § 5. In addition, Congress rescinded the Stream Protection Rule, which sought to 
limit environmental damage from mountaintop removal coal mining. See Stream Protec-
tion Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 93,066 (Dec. 20, 2016) (to be codified in scattered sections of 30 
C.F.R.), disapproved by H.R.J. Res. 38, Pub. L. No. 115-5, 131 Stat. 10 (2017).
112 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Citizens for Clean Energy v. DOI, 
No. 4:17-cv-00030 (D. Mont. Mar. 29, 2017), 2017 WL 1173696; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347.
113 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 3, California v. DOI, No. 4:17-cv-
00042 (D. Mont. May 9, 2017), 2017 WL 1862941.
114 30 U.S.C. §§ 181–263.
115 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1782.
116 Citizens for Clean Energy v. DOI, No. 4:17-cv-00030 (D. Mont. June 2, 2017) (order 
granting motion to consolidate cases).
117 Adam Vaughan, “Obama’s Clean Power Plan Hailed as US’s Strongest Ever Climate 
Action,” Guardian (Aug. 3, 2015).
118 See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric 
Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pt. 60).
119 Id. at 64,704.
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seeking to reduce electricity sector GHG emissions by nearly one-third of 
2005 levels by 2030.120 Although the CPP’s details were complex, the basic 
approach was straightforward: The EPA would set carbon dioxide (CO2) 
emissions reduction targets, and states would implement plans to achieve 
those goals.121
Almost immediately, the CPP became embroiled in litigation. Twenty-
nine states and over a dozen electric utilities sued, claiming the EPA had 
exceeded its authority under the Clean Air Act (CAA).122 Specifically, the 
parties asserted that CAA § 111(d),123 which the EPA relied on in issuing 
the CPP, did not grant authority to regulate GHG emissions from electric 
power plants—and that the CPP was otherwise unlawful.124 In response, on 
February 9, 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court, by a 5-4 vote, took the unusual 
step125 of issuing a stay enjoining the EPA from enforcing the CPP pending 
litigation.126 Consequently, the CPP never took full effect, and 19 states 
suspended their efforts to develop individual compliance plans.127
The Trump administration took equally quick action to dismantle the 
CPP. The President appointed Oklahoma Attorney General Scott Pruitt, a 
noted critic of both the CPP and the EPA, to head that agency.128 A week 
after the President issued his “energy independence” executive order, the 
EPA announced that it was, consistent with that order, conducting a review 
of the CPP and providing advance notice of “forthcoming” rulemaking 
120 Id. at 64,665.
121 See EPA, “Legal Memorandum Accompanying Clean Power Plan for Certain Issues,” 
at 1, 6, 23, https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-11/documents/cpp - legal - 
memo . pdf.
122 See Robinson Meyer, “The Supreme Court’s Devastating Decision on Climate,” The 
Atlantic (Feb. 10, 2016).
123 42 U.S.C. § 7411.
124 Petition for Review, West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 23, 2015).
125 This was the first time the Court had ever blocked an EPA rule using a stay. See Law-
rence Hurley & Valerie Volcovici, “U.S. Supreme Court Blocks Obama’s Clean Power Plan,” 
Scientific Am. (Feb. 9, 2016).
126 West Virginia v. EPA, 136 S. Ct. 1000 (2016).
127 See, e.g., E&E News, “E&E’s Power Plan Hub,” https://www.eenews.net/interactive/
clean_power_plan#planning_status. Twenty-eight states continued their efforts.
128 See Brady Dennis, “Scott Pruitt, Longtime Adversary of EPA, Confirmed to Lead the 
Agency,” Wash. Post (Feb. 17, 2017); see also, e.g., Letter from E. Scott Pruitt, EPA Adm’r, 
to Hon. Matt Bevin, Governor of Ky. (Mar. 30, 2017) (informing the Governor that EPA’s 
policy in light of the CPP stay was that “States have no obligation to spend resources to 
comply with a Rule that has been stayed”).
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proceedings reflecting that review.129 Six months later, the EPA proposed 
to repeal the CPP altogether.130
In proposing this repeal, the EPA, in a stark about-face, concluded that 
the CPP exceeded its authority under section 111(d). This was because, the 
agency said, the rule compelled utilities to “change their energy port folios” 
away from GHG-heavy fuels like coal to other alternatives like natural 
gas or renewables, rather than following usual agency practice of setting 
“emission guidelines” for power plants.131 This was problematic, the EPA 
reasoned, because it “necessitate[s] changes to a state’s energy policy,”132 
thus extending federal authority too far.
Since announcing this repeal, the EPA has been holding a variety of 
public hearings.133 It set January 16, 2018, as the deadline for public com-
ments, which it later extended to April 26, 2018.134 While repeal of the CPP 
remains a proposal for now, it is a virtual certainty that litigation will ensue 
once the EPA does move forward.135
[5] Vehicle Efficiency Standards
Consistent with the administration’s overall plan to roll back all Obama-
era climate regulations, President Trump also has sought to undo his 
predecessor’s efforts to increase vehicle efficiency. Following passage of 
the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007,136 and the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA,137 the Obama EPA and National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) jointly finalized new 
129 See Review of the CPP, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,329 (Apr. 4, 2017). The EPA also withdrew two 
CPP-related proposals. See Withdrawal of Proposed Rules: Federal Plan Requirements for 
GHG Emissions from Electric Utility Generating Units Constructed On or Before January 
8, 2014; Model Trading Rules; Amendments to Framework Regulations; and Clean Energy 
Incentive Program Design Details, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,144 (Apr. 3, 2017).
130 See Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: 
Electric Utility Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. 48,035 (proposed Oct. 16, 2017) (to be codi-
fied at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
131 Id. at 48,037.
132 Id.
133 See Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: 
Electric Utility Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. 51,787 (Nov. 8, 2017) (announcement of 
public hearing).
134 See Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: 
Electric Utility Generating Units, 83 Fed. Reg. 4620 (Feb. 1, 2018) (announcement of public 
listening sessions and extension of public comment period).
135 See Debra Kahn, “West Coast States Protest Repeal, Threaten Lawsuits,” Climate Wire 
(Mar. 1, 2018).
136 Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492.
137 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
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Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards requiring car manu-
facturers to meet fleet-wide efficiency averages of 54.5 miles per gallon 
by 2025.138 Addressing climate change was at the heart of this effort. The 
agencies estimated that their rule would reduce GHG emissions by an 
equivalent of 2 billion metric tons of CO2 and save nearly 4 billion barrels 
of oil consumption.139
Less than two months after President Trump took office, however, the 
EPA and NHTSA announced their intention to reconsider this Obama-era 
rule.140 Although the EPA had decided only months earlier to keep the 
standards in place, the March 22, 2017, notice of reconsideration stressed 
that agencies have “inherent authority to reconsider past decisions” and 
announced a review of the rules to be completed by April 1, 2018.141 The 
EPA then opened this review to comment142 and received nearly 300,000 
responses.143
A few months later, in April 2018, then-EPA Administrator Pruitt 
announced that he was reversing the agency’s prior determination not to 
alter the Obama-era CAFE standards.144 Those standards, he said, were 
“based on outdated information” and potentially “too stringent.”145 Spe-
cifically, he said he had determined that the standards created feasibility 
“challenges for auto manufacturers,” raised “potential” safety concerns, and 
imposed “significant additional costs on consumers, especially low-income 
consumers.”146 Accordingly, the EPA declared the existing CAFE stan-
dards “[o]n the whole . . . not appropriate” and announced that it would, 
138 2017 and Later Model Year Light-Duty Vehicle GHG Emissions and Corporate Aver-
age Fuel Economy Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 62,624, 69,627 (Oct. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 
40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 600 and 49 C.F.R. pts. 523, 531, 533, 536, 537).
139 Id.
140 See Notice of Intention to Reconsider the Final Determination of the Mid-Term 
Evaluation of GHG Emissions Standards for Model Year 2022–2025 Light Duty Vehicles, 
82 Fed. Reg. 14,671 (Mar. 22, 2017).
141 Id. at 14,671, 14,672.
142 See Request for Comment on Reconsideration of the Final Determination of the 
Mid-Term Evaluation of GHG Emissions Standards for Model Year 2022-2025 Light-Duty 
Vehicles; Request for Comment on Model Year 2021 GHG Emissions Standards, 82 Fed. 
Reg. 39,551 (Aug. 21, 2017).
143 Meanwhile, NHTSA announced that it would delay implementing increases to civil 
penalties for failure to comply with CAFE regulations. See Civil Penalties, 81 Fed. Reg. 
95,489 (Dec. 28, 2016) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 578); Civil Penalties, 82 Fed. Reg. 
32,139 (July 12, 2017) (delay of effective date).
144 See Mid-Term Evaluation of GHG Emissions Standards for Model Year 2022-2025 
Light-Duty Vehicles, 83 Fed. Reg. 16,077 (Apr. 13, 2018).
145 Id. at 16,077.
146 Id. at 16,078.
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with NHTSA, “further explore” new changes via notice-and-comment 
rulemaking.147
Within weeks, 17 states plus the District of Columbia challenged the 
EPA’s determination in the D.C. Circuit.148 The parties claim that EPA’s 
decision is arbitrary and capricious, inconsistent with the agency’s own 
regulations, and in violation of the CAA.149
Then, on August 1, 2018, the EPA continued its efforts to roll back 
Obama-era CAFE standards. It issued a notice of proposed rulemaking 
seeking to amend the requirements for passenger cars and light trucks, by 
freezing the standards at 2020 levels through 2026.150
§ 21.04 Hard Look Review
Part of what complicates the nation’s energy future under President 
Trump is the filtering lens of administrative law. Indeed, the very process 
of de- or re-regulation following a change in presidents inevitably invokes 
a host of administrative law principles.151 These run the gamut from pro-
cedural hurdles to deference questions under Chevron,152 Skidmore,153 and 
their ilk.154
When agencies switch policy positions, however, arguably the most 
central doctrine is arbitrary and capricious—or hard look—review.155 This 
principle, though flexible, constrains agencies by seeking to ensure that 
they both justify their decisions and do not shift course without merit. 
Thus, while the judiciary has expressly condoned the practice of agency 
policy change—including for political motivations—the executive branch 
does not enjoy carte blanche to evolve its policies willy-nilly.
147 Id. at 16,087.
148 See Press Release, Office of Governor of Cal., “California and States Representing 
Over 40 Percent of U.S. Car Market Sue to Defend National Clean Car Rules” (May 1, 2018); 
see also Petition for Review, California v. EPA, No. 18-1114 (D.C. Cir. May 1, 2018).
149 See Press Release, supra note 148.
150 The Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model Years 2021-2026 
Passenger Cars and Light Trucks, 83 Fed. Reg. 42,986 (Aug. 24, 2018).
151 See generally Bethany A. Davis Noll & Denise A. Grab, “Deregulation: Process and 
Procedures that Govern Agency Decisionmaking in an Era of Rollbacks,” 38 Energy L.J. 
269 (2017).
152 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
153 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
154 Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945).
155 See 5 U.S.C. §  706(2)(A); Emily Hammond Meazell, “Deference and Dialogue in 
Administrative Law,” 111 Colum. L. Rev. 1722, 1733 (2011).
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[1] The Law of Hard Look Review
Hard look review often is taken as a misnomer. This is because the 
inquiry’s overarching objective is supposed to focus on whether the agency 
took a hard look at the problem, not for courts to do so themselves. The 
reality, of course, is that anytime a court overturns an agency’s decision as 
arbitrary and capricious, it will feel like the court subjected the agency’s 
choice to some amount of searching scrutiny.
Courts recite the arbitrary and capricious standard in a variety of for-
mulations. The classic statement is that an agency fails hard look review 
if it has (1) “relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to con-
sider,” (2) “entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem,” 
(3) “offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence 
before the agency,” or (4) “is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to 
a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.”156
Thus, there are minimum thresholds an agency must meet for its decision 
to pass the arbitrary and capricious threshold. The agency “must examine 
the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action.”157 
It must draw a “rational connection between the facts found and the choice 
made.”158 And it “must give adequate reasons for its decisions”159—includ-
ing explaining itself such that the path of its logic “may reasonably be 
discerned.”160
Under this “narrow” scope of review, “a court is not to substitute its 
judgment for that of the agency.”161 However, courts do not conduct the 
review “merely to rubber stamp agency actions.”162 Instead, the review is 
“flexible”163 and acts “as a check upon administrators whose zeal might 
otherwise have carried them to excesses”164 by carefully balancing judicial 
review and “agency autonomy.”165
156 Meazell, supra note 155, at 1733 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).
157 State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43.
158 Id. (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).
159 Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125 (2016).
160 Id. (quoting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286 
(1974)).
161 State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43.
162 Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Daley, 209 F.3d 747, 755 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
163 Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
164 United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 644 (1950).
165 Albert W. Vanderlaan, Note, “Sending a Message to the Other Branches: Why the 
Second and Third Circuits Properly Used the APA to Rule on Fleeting Expletives and How 
the New FCC Can Undo the Damage,” 34 Vt. L. Rev. 447, 463 (2009).
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A trilogy of U.S. Supreme Court cases spanning three-and-a-half decades 
illustrates the doctrine’s contours.
[a] Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State 
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s seminal decision on hard look review is Motor 
Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Co.166 This case arose from a regulatory move directly parallel to the Trump 
administration’s current efforts. President Reagan’s campaign focused 
heavily on a broad promise of deregulation,167 including for automakers.168 
In State Farm, the Supreme Court evaluated the permissibility of one such 
deregulatory effort: NHTSA’s rescission of airbag and automatic seatbelt 
requirements for new vehicles.
Expressly acknowledging that agency rules need not be permanently 
engraved in stone, the Court nonetheless overturned NHTSA’s rescission 
as arbitrary and capricious. This was for both substantive and procedural 
reasons.
First, NHTSA gave no consideration to amending the prior, Carter-era 
rule to require that only airbags be used, rather than airbags or automatic 
seatbelts.169 The agency’s complete failure to “even consider the possibil-
ity” of an airbags-only option, the Court unanimously held, rendered this 
deregulatory choice unlawful.170
Second, the Court, by a 5-4 margin, also found the agency “too quick to 
dismiss the safety benefits of automatic seatbelts.”171 Specifically, the Court 
ruled that while it might have been justifiable to eliminate this rule, the 
agency’s record did not support its ultimate conclusion. This was because 
theNHTSA neither addressed the difference between detachable auto-
matic and manual seatbelts nor explained why it did not simply require 
nondetachable automatic seatbelts.172
166 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
167 See James F. Blumstein, “Regulatory Review by the Executive Office of the President: 
An Overview and Policy Analysis of Current Issues,” 51 Duke L.J. 851, 859 (2001).
168 See Kathryn A. Watts, “Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious 
Review,” 119 Yale L.J. 2, 59 (2009).
169 State Farm, 463 U.S. at 46.
170 Id. at 48.
171 Id. at 51.
172 Id. at 52–53.
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[b] FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.
Arguably the U.S. Supreme Court’s most important arbitrary and capri-
cious decision since State Farm came in 2009 in FCC v. Fox Television Sta-
tions, Inc.173 Fox involved mirror image facts to State Farm.
In Fox, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), under Presi-
dent George W. Bush, sought to impose more onerous indecency restric-
tions on television broadcasters. Specifically, the FCC’s new policy, “for the 
first time,” found that nonliteral uses of “the F- and S-Words” during live 
television broadcasts “could be actionably indecent, even when the word is 
used only once.”174 Despite the agency’s sharp break with past practice, the 
Court upheld the FCC’s new enforcement policy.
The Court began by declining the broadcasters’ invitation to impose a 
more rigorous standard of review simply because the agency had changed 
policy positions. Rather, the Court found “no basis” in the APA or its own 
precedent “for a requirement that all agency change be subjected to more 
searching review.”175 Indeed, as the Court noted, “State Farm neither held 
nor implied that every agency action representing a policy change must be 
justified by reasons more substantial than those required to adopt a policy 
in the first instance.”176
That threshold question settled, the Court found the agency’s new policy 
justified by the factual record. The FCC, the Court said, “acknowledged 
that its recent actions [had] broken new ground,” and then backed up 
that choice with reasons that “were entirely rational.”177 These included 
that “[e]ven isolated utterances” can be vulgar and that “a safe harbor for 
single words would ‘likely lead to more widespread use of the offensive 
language.’ ”178
[c] Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro
Most recently, the U.S. Supreme Court completed its hard look trilogy in 
Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro.179 Unlike State Farm and Fox, this case 
involved not the repeal or tightening of a regulation, but rather the sudden 
volte-face of one.
173 556 U.S. 502 (2009); see Jodi L. Short, “The Political Turn in American Administrative 
Law: Power, Rationality, and Reasons,” 61 Duke L.J. 1811, 1813 (2012).
174 Fox, 556 U.S. at 508.
175 Id. at 514.
176 Id.
177 Id. at 517.
178 Id. at 518 (quoting In re Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licenses Regarding 
the Airing of the “Golden Globe Awards” Program, 19 FCC Rcd. 4975, 4979 (2004)).
179 136 S. Ct. 2117 (2016).
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Encino Motorcars arose out of the Obama Department of Labor’s (DOL) 
decision to reverse a prior regulation that exempted “service advisors” 
at car dealerships from overtime compensation.180 In deciding whether 
this policy flip-flop was arbitrary and capricious, the Court reiterated its 
stance from Fox: “When an agency changes its existing position, it ‘need 
not always provide a more detailed justification than what would suffice 
for a new policy created on a blank slate.’ ”181 But, the Court emphasized, 
the agency must provide a “reasoned explanation” for its about-face.182 
An unexplained inconsistency in agency policy is grounds for judicial 
invalidation.183
By a 7-2 vote, the Court found the DOL’s policy reversal unlawful. 
First—and unlike the broadcasters in Fox—the retail automobile and truck 
dealership industry had relied on the prior DOL rule for decades, negotiat-
ing and structuring their compensation plans against the backdrop of that 
rule.184 Second—and unlike the FCC in Fox—the DOL “said almost noth-
ing” in the way of “good reasons for the new policy.”185 Instead of offering 
a reasoned explanation for its change, the DOL simply asserted that its 
regulation was “reasonable.”186 Because “[i]t is not the role of the courts to 
speculate on reasons that might have supported an agency’s decision,” the 
Court found the new regulation insufficient under hard look review.187
[2] Hard Look Review in Practice
The State Farm trilogy thus established a trinity of principles that guide 
arbitrary and capricious review. First, agencies may alter their policies over 
time. Second, agencies must acknowledge when they are changing policy 
positions.188 And third, agencies must justify their new policies—but the 
“reasons for the new policy” need not be “better than the reasons for the 
old one.”189
These principles are key to understanding the ground rules that govern 
a common situation for agencies: They want to alter, amend, or rescind 
180 Id. at 2123.
181 Id. at 2125 (quoting Fox, 556 U.S. at 515).
182 Id.
183 Id. at 2126.
184 Id.
185 Id. at 2127 (quoting Fox, 556 U.S. at 515).
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 See also Nehemiah Corp. of Am. v. Jackson, 546 F. Supp. 2d 830, 842 (E.D. Cal. 2008).
189 Fox, 556 U.S. at 515.
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existing policy positions, whether because facts have changed, their 
approach is not working, or politics have shifted, including through a 
change in presidents.190 State Farm, Fox, and Encino Motorcars, however, 
only provide an initial glimpse into how stringently courts actually review 
changes in agencies’ policy positions.
Here, then, we explore two doctrines that often come into play when 
agencies reverse or alter policy: first, that political influence generally 
does not expressly factor into courts’ hard look calculus, and second, that 
prior factual records and reliance interests may, in effect, constrain agency 
leeway.
[a] Political Influence
The U.S. Supreme Court has never fully answered the question of “how 
courts should approach agency decisions relying on political pressure 
rather than expert analysis.”191 The debate traces to at least State Farm itself. 
There, Justice Rehnquist—joined by three other justices—contended that 
administrative policy shifts deriving from a presidential change are pre-
sumptively justified, because they arguably reflect the democratic choice 
of the people.192
Nonetheless, courts typically have not countenanced political motiva-
tions in their express arbitrary and capricious analyses.193 Instead, the 
question of politics tends to lurk beneath the surface, seemingly influ-
encing courts’ starting points in ineluctable ways, but remaining notably 
absent from their explicit focus on the agency record itself.
Thus, more than one commentator has argued for recasting the hard look 
standard in light of the role that politics inevitably plays in agency decision 
making.194 As then-Professor Kagan suggested, an “alternative” vision of 
hard look review “centered on the political leadership and accountability 
provided by the President” might offer a more honest appraisal for how 
courts actually see these questions.195
Indeed, one possible reading of State Farm is that what the Court really 
wanted was for the agency to tell “the full story” and thus “be forced ‘to 
190 See Encino Motorcars, 136 S. Ct. at 2125.
191 Eric Berger, “Individual Rights, Judicial Deference, and Administrative Law Norms in 
Constitutional Decision Making,” 91 B.U. L. Rev. 2029, 2080–81 (2011).
192 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 59 (1983).
193 See Watts, supra note 168, at 6.
194 See, e.g., Berger, supra note 191, at 2080–81.
195 Elena Kagan, “Presidential Administration,” 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2380 (2001).
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reveal the political basis for its decisions.’ ”196 Under such a reading, an 
agency’s action is more likely to be arbitrary and capricious if it fails to 
disclose how politics influenced its decision. Encino Motorcars arguably 
underscores this point. As one commentator has noted, that case sent the 
message that agencies “can’t just get away with . . . political flip-flops,” espe-
cially without justifying them.197
By contrast, other decisions seem to cut wide paths for agencies to 
change directions even for overtly political reasons. Fox may lead the field. 
As one commentator has suggested, Fox presumptively “makes it easier for 
agencies to change their policies” based on politics, particularly since the 
dissent there lost the argument that the lack of a higher standard of review 
allows regulation to “bend too readily before the political winds.”198
Given this tension in U.S. Supreme Court precedent, it should not be 
surprising that courts tend not to focus on political influence in hard look 
review, at least at face value. Still, at least one court has struck down as arbi-
trary and capricious an agency decision where it detected improper politi-
cal influence. In Tummino v. Torti,199 the U.S. District Court for the Eastern 
District of New York found unlawful the Food and Drug Administration’s 
(FDA) refusal to allow women under age 17 to use the Plan B emergency 
contraceptive without a prescription.200 The court began by observing that 
it is generally unlawful for agencies to act in “subjective bad faith.”201 The 
court then found that the FDA had displayed a “lack of good faith,” in part, 
because it acted pursuant to “pressure emanating from the White House” 
and anti-abortion constituents rather than making its own decision based 
on the facts.202 Specifically, the court noted that the FDA Commissioner 
had discussed the pending decision with a subordinate who was in contact 
with the White House, and then “made [the] decision before FDA staff had 
completed their scientific reviews of [the] data.”203
196 Kathryn A. Watts, “Controlling Presidential Control,” 114 Mich. L. Rev. 683, 743–44 
(2016) (quoting Lisa Schultz Bressman, “Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law,” 107 
Colum. L. Rev. 1749, 1783 (2007)).
197 Dialogue, “The Future of Administrative Law: DOJ/ENRD Symposium on the Future 
of Environmental Law,” 47 Envtl. L. Rep. News & Analysis 10185, 10193 (2017) (statement 
of Professor Richard J. Pierce, Jr.).
198 Watts, supra note 168, at 10; see FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 547 
(2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
199 603 F. Supp. 2d 519 (E.D.N.Y. 2009), amended sub nom. Tummino v. Hamburg, No. 
1:05-cv-00366, 2013 WL 865851 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2013).
200 Id. at 546.
201 Id. at 542.
202 Id. at 544.
203 Id. at 530.
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Tummino has been characterized as an unusual case, and it may be. 
Nonetheless, the case offers a toehold for other courts to strike down 
agency actions where political influence appears to be driving the result.204 
How far that reasoning can extend is the question. At least some observ-
ers think not far. As two commentators recently argued: “So long as agen-
cies can articulate some reasoned defense based on statutory terms, even 
if some political factor drove the decision, courts can manage to ignore 
politics. The charade disintegrates only when the agency has no facially 
plausible alternative story it can tell.”205
In short, while political influence may well color how a court engages 
in hard look review, relying on that idea as the sole rationale for attacking 
agency policy flip-flops is not a path well-trodden in administrative law 
jurisprudence.
[b] Prior Factual Records and Established 
Expectations
While State Farm and its progeny appear to embrace—rather than 
resolve—the tension over how much politics may drive agency decision 
making, courts have developed a corollary doctrine that may neverthe-
less constrain agencies seeking to alter their approach based on politics. 
In such cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled, agencies must provide 
a more detailed justification if either of two circumstances exist: (1) the 
“new policy rests upon factual findings that contradict those which under-
lay its prior policy,” or (2) the prior policy has created “serious reliance 
interests.”206
The factual finding point manifests in the contrast between State Farm 
and Fox. In State Farm, NHTSA failed hard look review because it “did not 
address its prior factual findings.”207 By contrast, in Fox, the FCC’s policy 
flip-flop passed muster because the agency “did not base its prior policy on 
factual findings.”208
204 Contra Cook Inlet Beluga Whale v. Daley, 156 F. Supp. 2d 16, 22 (D.D.C. 2001) 
(although political considerations may have affected the decision not to list the Cook Inlet 
Beluga Whale under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the evidence “did not establish 
that, but for ‘politics,’ the whale would have been listed under the ESA or that political 
considerations became part of the decision making process”).
205 Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, “The Lost World of Administrative Law,” 
92 Tex. L. Rev. 1137, 1168 (2014) (footnote omitted).
206 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009).
207 Id. at 538 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
208 Id.
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Organized Village of Kake v. USDA209 provides another example. That 
case arose out of the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) 2001 
“Roadless Rule,” which “limit[ed] road construction and timber harvest-
ing in national forests.”210 The USDA originally found that exempting 
the Tongass National Forest “would risk the loss of important [ecologi-
cal] values.”211 But in 2003, after President George W. Bush’s election, the 
agency—relying on the same 2001 record—reversed course and found it 
“unnecessary” to apply the rule to the Tongass National Forest.212 The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found this reversal arbitrary and 
capricious. The USDA, the court said, relied on “factual findings directly 
contrary” to its 2001 findings, without providing a “reasoned explanation” 
for that choice.213 In so holding, the Ninth Circuit emphasized the broader 
political context: “There was a change in presidential administrations just 
days after the Roadless Rule was promulgated in 2001. Elections have 
policy consequences. But, State Farm teaches that even when reversing a 
policy after an election, an agency may not simply discard prior factual 
findings without a reasoned explanation.”214
The U.S. Supreme Court also has held that where a prior policy “has 
engendered serious reliance interests,” the agency must offer a reasoned 
explanation for disregarding those interests.215 This rule seeks to balance 
the “unfairness” of the policy change with “the government’s interest in 
applying its new view.”216
Again, the contrast between two cases from the Supreme Court’s hard 
look trilogy illustrates the point. In Encino Motorcars, the Court found the 
DOL’s policy change arbitrary and capricious in part because “[d]ealer-
ships and service advisors [had] negotiated and structured their compen-
sation plans” according to the agency’s prior position.217 However, in Fox, 
209 795 F.3d 956 (9th Cir. 2015).
210 Id. at 959.
211 Id. at 960 (quoting Special Areas; Roadless Area Conservation, 66 Fed. Reg. 3244, 
3254 (Jan. 12, 2001) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 294)).
212 Id. at 962 (quoting Special Areas; Roadless Area Conservation; Applicability to the 
Tongass National Forest, 68 Fed. Reg. 75,136, 75,137 (Dec. 30, 2003) (to be codified at 36 
C.F.R. pt., 294)).
213 Id. at 968; cf. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. EPA, 682 F.3d 1032, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 
2012).
214 Vill. of Kake, 795 F.3d at 968.
215 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009).
216 Ronald M. Levin, “Hard Look Review, Policy Change, and Fox Television,” 65 U. 
Miami L. Rev. 555, 567 (2011).
217 Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2126 (2016).
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the Court sanctioned wide ground for the FCC to change positions, no 
doubt in part because the “transition costs resulting from reliance on the 
former fleeting-expletives policy were not significantly involved . . . .”218
Likewise, in Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen, the court pointed to reliance inter-
ests as key to its conclusion that the plaintiffs were entitled to an injunc-
tion of the Trump administration’s attempted termination of the Deferred 
Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program.219 That program allows 
“certain individuals without lawful immigration status who entered the 
United States as children to . . . . work, study, and keep building lives in 
this country.”220 Noting the extensive reliance interests of DACA recipients’ 
families, employers, and educational institutions in shaping their lives, 
careers, and futures, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New 
York found this alone “sufficient to render [the Department of Homeland 
Security’s] supposedly discretionary decision to end the DACA program 
arbitrary and capricious.”221
[3] Hard Look Review and the Trump Energy Policy
Implementation of the Trump administration’s energy policy has already 
put a tangle of legal issues before the courts.222 These judicial dustups are 
likely to become only more prevalent and complex with time. They are 
complex in part simply because of the vastness of the Trump administra-
tion’s efforts. Yet they are also complex because of how hard look review 
tends to be implemented in practice. In this vein, how the administration’s 
energy policy will fare before the judiciary on hard look challenges reduces 
to two key questions.
The first is whether the openly political nature of the administration’s 
policies will help or hurt it. As precedent shows, politics can cut both ways. 
As the State Farm dissent recognized, policy shifts that trace directly to 
presidential elections gain some legal cover from the idea that an election 
reflects the democratic will of the people—or, at least, that electoral ritual 
can partially legitimize agencies’ policy shifts. On the other hand, even as 
courts generally are reluctant to expressly address politics as a formal part 
of their arbitrary and capricious analysis, the reality may be that courts 
come at cases with a different orientation when it is clear politics under-
girds their decision more than anything else. This may be in part because 
218 Levin, supra note 216, at 567.
219 279 F. Supp. 3d 401 (E.D.N.Y. 2018).
220 Id. at 406–07.
221 Id. at 431.
222 See Lisa Heinzerling, “Unreasonable Delays: The Legal Problems (So Far) of Trump’s 
Deregulatory Binge,” 12 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 13 (2018); Noll & Grab, supra note 151.
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agencies’ political motivations may incline them to play faster and looser 
with the facts. It also may be part of the explanation for studies that have 
shown higher affirmance rates by Democratic judicial appointees of “lib-
eral” agency decisions, and vice versa.223 The smell of politics (or politics 
they dislike) puts judges’ antennae up.
What is less clear is whether it is politics itself that gives courts umbrage, 
or if it is agency disingenuousness that invokes judicial skepticism when 
politics is involved—because the agency says it is acting for one reason 
but it obviously is acting for another. The medicine here is clear. Agencies 
and courts both should own up to what role politics plays in their decision 
making, so that the merits can be dealt with out in the open rather than 
through a distorted lens, or in code. Past administrations typically have 
not deemed it wise to be so brazen.224 However, the Trump administration 
appears already to be expressly invoking politics to justify its administra-
tive decisions to some degree.225
Of course, merely acknowledging the role of politics in their decision-
making processes will not inoculate agencies from legal barrage, even if 
it may give them credit with the court for fair dealing. They still have to 
justify their choices. That, then, leads to the second question.
That question is whether any hard look review tripwires will hobble the 
Trump administration’s energy efforts. At the outset of addressing this 
question, it is critical to emphasize that if hard look review is anything, it 
is highly granular, fact-specific, and context-dependent.226 So, just because 
one Trump regulatory U-turn survives judicial scrutiny does not mean 
another, even related, effort will as well.
What we can say is that, tactically at least, the Trump administration’s 
repeal-everything-as-fast-as-possible approach has something to com-
mend it. It renders arguments that the Obama-era rules need to stay in 
place because parties have detrimentally relied on them difficult indeed. 
These rules were not around long in the first place, and now, their shelf life 
already has been called into question.
223 See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, “The Real World of Arbitrariness Review,” 75 
U. Chi. L. Rev. 761, 767 (2008).
224 See Noll & Grab, supra note 151, at 294.
225 See Heinzerling, supra note 222, at 41, 46.
226 See Mark Seidenfeld, “The Role of Politics in A Deliberative Model of the Admin-
istrative State,” 81 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1397, 1456 (2013); see also Natural Res. Def. Coun-
cil, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (noting that the “stringency of our 
review” depends, among other things, on the “impartiality of the agency as regards the 
issue presented”).
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Where the Trump administration will have more trouble, then, is in pro-
cedurally and substantively justifying what it is doing on energy. Courts can 
be persnickety on agency procedure, especially when they sense something 
else is awry,227 and the Trump administration has already run into trouble 
on these grounds. Twice, in fact, the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of California rejected the BLM’s efforts to delay the Waste Preven-
tion Rule because the agency did not adequately explain itself.228 As one 
commentator has suggested, the administration’s explanations for why it 
needs to delay Obama-era rules have seemed rushed and slapdash across 
the board, not just on energy—and often with reasoning that is “entirely 
circular: the agency needs to delay the effective date because the agency 
needs to delay the effective date. Stating a conclusion is not the same as 
explaining it.”229
Substantiating new or different energy rules may pose an even higher 
hurdle for the administration, at least in some cases. This is the hard look 
game. State Farm and its progeny expressly contemplate that agencies will 
change their policies, including for political reasons. Agencies, however, 
must then substantively justify their new policies as both legal and good. 
This is the hard work of the administrative state. It involves evidence and 
technical expertise and minutiae, all while acknowledging and addressing 
the impacts that proposed rules will have on society. Undoing prior rules, 
in other words, is entirely feasible. But the more well-built the prior rule is, 
the more difficult it is to undo—and the more quickly that work of rescis-
sion is done, the more likely it will not be up to par.
Certainly, the Trump administration inevitably will ground some of its 
choices in fact sufficiently to emerge from the gauntlet of judicial review. 
The Obama administration had good reasons for withdrawing federal 
lands from coal leasing, for instance, but those reasons do not foreclose 
others that might lead to an opposite conclusion. On some such decisions, 
Congress intentionally has given agencies wide berth, expecting that they 
will exercise their expertise or balance the public interest in a way that 
matches society’s evolving needs over time. In such circumstances, courts 
are less likely to intervene.
In other cases, though, the factual record built by the Obama admin-
istration will be more difficult to discard.230 NHTSA has some leeway in 
227 See, e.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015); see also Louis J. Virelli III, “Decon-
structing Arbitrary and Capricious Review,” 92 N.C. L. Rev. 721, 743 (2014).
228 See § 21.03[1][a], supra.
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Before a New President Arrives,” 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 557, 594–95 (2003).
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deciding how aggressive vehicle efficiency standards should be, but the 
EPA’s finding that GHG emissions from mobile sources endanger public 
health and welfare rests on much more than a thin reed. Reversing that 
conclusion—or finding that electricity-sector GHG emissions need not be 
regulated, even if the President believes climate change is a “hoax”—will 
not be an easy task. The science simply points the wrong way. Likewise for 
onshore oil and gas: It may be that the Trump BLM can explain why the 
Obama BLM had it wrong on fugitive methane emissions, especially if it 
makes a new case for how the balance of public benefits and regulatory 
compliance costs comes out differently. But suggesting that natural gas on 
federal lands simply should be burned off at the same time the adminis-
tration is clamoring for more domestic fossil fuel production—that logic 
would seem harder to sell.
Much of courts’ hard work in the energy realm in the coming years, 
then, will be carefully examining each of these claims, deciding where the 
Trump agencies’ records stack up and where they do not. The courts will 
engage in this endeavor against the broader backdrop of the hard look 
standard—a standard that is designed to often defer to agencies. No doubt, 
the Trump administration knew this as it developed, planned, and then 
implemented its energy policy. Prior studies have shown that agencies 
enjoy quite successful records in the courts against arbitrary and capricious 
challenges. Agencies’ chances at prevailing may be as high as 90% in the 
Supreme Court231 and 70–75% in the various circuits of the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals.232 Moreover, as one commentator has shown, even when a court 
invalidates an agency’s decision as arbitrary and capricious, that is not the 
end of the matter. Rather, agencies have a strong record of resuscitating 
their policies in these circumstances, successfully re-implementing their 
policies “in approximately 80% of the instances in which courts have origi-
nally remanded rules as arbitrary and capricious.”233 Although, on average, 
it takes an agency two years to do this, in more than half of the cases ana-
lyzed, it took “less than a year.”234
231 See Adrian Vermeule, Law’s Abnegation 191 (2016).
232 See Frank B. Cross, “Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals,” 91 Calif. 
L. Rev. 1457, 1503 (2003); Miles & Sunstein, supra note 223, at 767; David Zaring, “Reason-
able Agencies,” 96 Va. L. Rev. 135, 173 (2010); see also Jacob Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, 
“Thin Rationality Review,” 114 Mich. L. Rev. 1355, 1358 (2016).
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Rulemaking?” 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 393, 440 (2000).
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In short, the battle over what the nation’s energy policy will be going for-
ward will not stop with hard look review in the courts. It may well simply 
pause—or begin again—there.
§ 21.05 Conclusion
The Trump administration wants an energy future that turns heavily 
back to the past. It seeks to return U.S. energy policy to a metamorphosed 
version of what existed prior to the Obama administration—a policy 
focused on domestic energy sources, domestic energy production, and 
achieving a new world order where the United States not only uses fossil 
fuels ubiquitously at home but dominates global exports of them. This is a 
policy, the administration says, not of domestic energy independence but 
of U.S. energy “dominance.”
Whether the Trump administration will achieve such ambitious aspira-
tions is highly questionable. Its policy play swims against quite strong real-
world currents that have emerged in the energy sphere in the last decade, 
including the burgeoning emergence of renewables, increased emphasis 
on efficiency, and global pressure to address climate change. More directly, 
the implementation of this policy already has faced substantial legal push-
back—and will only face more. To date, the Trump administration has 
notched both victories and significant defeats on this front. Many of these 
future challenges will turn on legal questions other than hard look review, 
but there is no question that doctrine will play a heavy role going forward. 
In this regard, if past is prologue, the future of the Trump energy policy 
is murky at best. Courts have been reluctant to rely solely on the politi-
cal nature of policy flip-flops to overturn them as unlawful, but the more 
political such choices are, the more searching scrutiny they may receive.
And the Trump energy policy is—more than anything else—political at 
its core.
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